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ABSTRACT
Human rights are one of the topical issues in today’s society, on a European as 
well as on a global level and their protection is the subject of regulation by means 
of various conventions, declarations and charters. The European system of human 
rights protection is multidimensional and without a clear hierarchy. In this article, 
the Author presents the basic organizational determinants and a short overview of 
judgments and functioning of two courts, the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg and the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, in the fi eld of human 
rights.  
1. INTRODUCTION
Human rights are one of the topical issues in today’s society, on a European 
as well as on a global level and their protection is the subject of regulation by 
means of various conventions, declarations and charters. However, the basic 
concepts crucial for the existence and proper development of the human rights 
system, such as the very term “human rights”, and concepts such as freedom, 
priority right and minorities, have vague meanings, and are consequently prac-
tically disputable. Therefore, it is not surprising that there are many defi nitions 
and theories related to this topic. The circular defi nition of human rights itself 
and a lack of clarity about the sources of these rights (whether we have them 
because they derive from natural law or we have the rights that are given to us 
by the community1) lead to a situation in which the human rights are becoming 
*  PhD student, Faculty of Law in Zagreb, University of Zagreb; katarinaperocevic@gmail.com.
1 Graovac,G., Geneza i važnost prava na osobnu slobodu, Zagrebačka pravna revija 2(2) 
2013; p. 240
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dependent on the cultural - social - political interpretations of different societ-
ies, and are consequently a source of confl ict. A clarifi cation of the above-men-
tioned concepts is of fundamental importance for the system of human rights 
protection, both on the European and the global level.
In the next few paragraphs, the basic organizational determinants of the Eu-
ropean human rights system will be elucidated and a short overview will be 
given on the judgments and the functioning of two courts, the European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg and the European Court of Justice in Luxem-
bourg.
2. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 as an international organization 
for the protection of human rights in Europe. At the very beginning of its 
work, it adopted the European Convention on Human Rights, signed in Rome 
on November 4th, 1950.
The catalogue of rights laid down in the Convention was inspired by the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human rights adopted two years earlier2. The Convention 
has established the European Commission of Human rights and the European 
Court for Human rights which were replaced by a single court sitting full time 
in 1998, in line with Protocol No. 11. The European Court for Human rights 
(ECtHR) is a judicial body for dispute resolution in the specifi c fi eld of human 
rights. The ECtHR is situated in Strasbourg. It has become the largest interna-
tional Court dealing with human rights. It is composed of as many judges as 
there are contracting Parties3 (47 today). 
In its work, the Court applies the European Convention of Human Rights, in 
which these rights, among others, are guaranteed: the right to life4, the right 
not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,5 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion6, the right to marry and found a 
family7. 
2  Barrionuevo Arevalo, L., Adjudication of International Disoutes in Europe: The role of 
the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human rights, p.10; (http://www.euc.
illinois.edu/_includes/docs/barrionuevo_European_Courts_Article1.pdf)
3 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 20, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Convention_ENG.pdf
4 Article 2, European Convention on Human Rights
5 Article 3, European Convention on Human Rights
6 Article 9, European Convention on Human Rights
7 Article12, European Convention on Human Rights
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The Convention provides limits to the rights, under the condition that these 
limits are foreseen by law, necessary in a democratic society and proportion-
ate to the aim. The rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention are 
applied to anyone within the jurisdiction of its Contracting Parties. Thus, any 
Contracting State or private person, group of people, or a non-governmental 
organization which claims that its rights guaranteed by the Convention are 
violated by the state, may bring legal proceedings, after having exhausted all 
domestic legal remedies, as stated in the Handyside judgment8. When the Con-
vention came into force, the majority of signatory States rejected proposals to 
give individuals the right of petition. Thus, the State could be made respondent 
only if the State gave its consent, either given ad hoc or by means of an option-
al clause, by which the States accepts the jurisdiction of the Court in advance. 
An individual petition was possible only if the State in question accepted in ad-
vance. Also, an individual did not have direct access to the Court, nor a possi-
bility of individual complaint. Protocol No 11, which came into force in 1998, 
substantially changed the way the Convention was applied and monitored, by 
subjecting the Contracting State to the absolute supervision by the European 
Court of Human Rights. The ECtHR is not an appellate court of the Member 
states, as it was stated in the Edward judgment9. The Contracting Parties com-
mit oneself to abide the fi nal judgment of the Court in any case to which they 
are parties10. Judgments by the Strasbourg Court are essentially declaratory 
judgments. The Court itself cannot annul or amend national measures or court 
decisions. Their execution is monitored by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe.
In the process of execution of judgments, the ECtHR gives guidance to mem-
ber states on how their law or practices must change in order to comply with 
the Convention, keeping in mind the different interpretations of the Conven-
tion from one Contracting State to another.
8 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, (5493/72) [1976] ECHR 5 (7 December 1976): “The 
Convention leaves to each Contracting State, in the fi rst place, the task of securing the rights 
and freedom siten shrines. The institutions created by it make their own contribution to this 
task but they become involve donly through contentious proceedings and once all domestic 
remedies have been exhausted’’
9 Edwards v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13071/87, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 417, 431 (1992): 
it is not within the province of the European Court to substitute its own assessment of the facts 
for that of the domestic court and, as a general rule, it is for these courts to assess the evidence 
before them. The Court’s task is to ascertain whether the Court has jurisdiction over the pro-
tection of human rights in many Member States, and does not examine and determine the facts 
of each individual case proceedings in their entirety, including the questions whether the ways 
in which evidence was taken, were fair
10 Article 46, European Convention on Human Rights
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The Convention defi nes a minimum standard for the protection of human 
rights which a Contracting State should respect, and this way it can be con-
cluded that the ECtHR will not expand its competences, but will ensure that 
the existing rights are not violated. The Convention defi nes the seven, eight 
or ten fundamental freedoms that are essential for a democratic way of life11. 
In its work, the ECtHR applies the margin of appreciation doctrine, which 
gives to the Contracting parties an opportunity to decide on questions on 
which Contracting States often have different opinions. “Where the domestic 
law and practice of the Contracting states reveal a fairly substantial measure 
of common ground, a more extensive European supervision corresponds to a 
less discretionary power of appreciation12”.
In certain areas, the ECtHR gives to the Contracting States a wide margin of 
appreciation, so they can decide about the languages taught at public schools13, 
whether to allow or prohibit suicide or assisted suicide14, or determine when 
it is necessary to interfere with the freedom of expression in a democratic 
society15.The Court acts as a subsidiary Court especially in matters of moral 
nature, such as the criminalization of abortion, conjugal visits in prisons, etc.16. 
The ECtHR has dealt least with political and cultural issues, and most deci-
sions were brought in the area of freedom of expression. 
Even when not taking the margin of appreciation into account, the ECtHR has 
in many ways infl uenced the legislation and the conduct of Contracting States. 
Its judgments have the same effect as verdicts of the national courts, and the 
Contracting States change their legislation by aligning it with the Convention. 
Also, the Convention rights have an impact beyond any individual case to the 
extent that national offi cials, legislators, executives and judges take ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence into account in their own decision-making17.
11 Paul Costa, J., The European Court of Human Rights and Its Recent Case Law, TEXAS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, (VOL. 38:455), p.458
12 ECHR, Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, (application 6538/74), judgment of 26.4.1979, 
para. 59.
13 Gless, S. and Martin, J., The comparative method in European Courts: A comparis on 
between the CJEU and ECtHR, Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 1, 
Issue 1, 2013, p. 40.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Gless, S. and Martin, J., The comparative method in European Courts: A comparison be-
tween the CJEU and ECtHR, Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 1, 
Issue 1,2013, p. 41
17 Stone Sweet, Alec, On the Constitution alisation of the Convention: The European Court of 
Human Rights as a Constitutional Court, Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, p.4
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In many States, the ECtHR constitutes a part of domestic law and does not 
require special ways of implementation. In many cases judges routinely invoke 
the Convention and the national courts have been induced to strengthen their 
own systems of rights protection18.
The ECtHR and the Convention have had a great effect on the national legis-
lation of Contracting States.  We will now examine the issue of the European 
Court of Justice.
3. THE COURT OF JUSTICE
As one of the European Union (EU) institutions, the Court of Justice (ECJ) has a 
fundamental role in furthering the objectives laid down in the Treaties, and is of-
ten called “the engine of European union”. Some theoreticians consider the ECJ 
as a constitutional Court, for others it is a typical international Court, while some 
say it is only a supranational Court. In whatever frame we put it, the fact remains 
that the Court has the fi nal say on EU law, and thus it has the leading role in the 
EU legal order. The Court of Justice was established in 1952 as a single Court of 
Justice of the European Coal and Steel Communities, based in Luxembourg. It 
is composed of one judge per member state – currently are 28.
Throughout the past six decades, the ECJ has been experiencing changes, both 
formal and material ones, and has been monitoring changes in society, broad-
ening its sphere of action. The history of the EU has been made up of judg-
ments of the ECJ, and its opinions and interpretations have created and are 
creating a new European legal order.
Since the establishment of the ECJ, the founding members have had different 
visions in terms of its role and responsibilities. It was the wish of the Benelux 
countries that the court could determine questions both of legality and of dis-
cretion, and that only member states, and not individuals, should have access 
to it19. The Germans wanted a Court that would be more similar to a constitu-
tional Court, and the French thought that the Court should not determine more 
than the legality of the decisions, and that even the right for private litigants to 
sue in the court is a step too far20. Its role and competences were the result of a 
18 Stone Sweet, Alec, On the Constitutionalisation of the Convention: The European Court of 
Human Rights as a Constitutional Court, Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, p.10
19  Tamm, D., The history of the Court of Justice, p.17, http://research.ku.dk/search/?pure=en/
publications/the-history-of-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-since-its-origin%28b-
c456acc-cc1c-4518-9186-3cd6297653e2%29/export.html
20  Tamm, D., The history of the Court of Justice, p.17, http://research.ku.dk/search/?pure=en/
publications/the-history-of-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-since-its-origin%28b-
c456acc-cc1c-4518-9186-3cd6297653e2%29/export.html
Intereulaweast, Vol. II (2) 2015
6
compromise based on the idea of creating a new Europe. The ECJ underwent 
important institutional changes in 1986, when the Court of First Instance was 
attached to it by the Single European Act in order to reduce its heavy caseload. 
In 2009, the Court of First Instance was renamed as the General Court. A spe-
cialized court, the Civil Service Tribunal, was created in 2004. 
 These formal changes to the structure of the ECJ were followed by procedural 
changes, as well as material ones, relating to jurisdiction, which indirectly 
caused an increase in the variety of cases on which the court passed judgment.
4. THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH 
JUDGMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ECJ
“The questions whether the company should pay the tax, whether a tenant 
is entitled to compensation or restrictions that can be made upon the import 
or export of whisky or cherry brandy are not the questions of same interest 
as abortion, penalty, and the right to carry a weapon21”. The character of the 
Union has changed through the decades and the political project was to be re-
alized through economic means. Does the Union change its character through 
the interpretation of the ECJ judgments or does the ECJ extend its jurisdiction 
because of the changes in the character of the Union? Whatever the answer, we 
can now conclude that the Union is expanding its competences regarding in-
quiries which are more than just economic issues, such as questions about fun-
damental rights, taxes, asylum, competition, consumer protection, visas, social 
aid, security policy, etc. Its judgments have political and social consequences 
which affect the daily life of its citizens. All these questions have great moral, 
political and social implications. 
Treaties establishing the European Communities did not contain the provi-
sions on the protection of human rights, although plans to create the European 
political community and the European Defense Community have indicated 
that possibility22. Initially, the European Community had an almost exclusively 
economic character, and its goals were almost exclusively of economic nature. 
Issues of human rights were not widely discussed.
With time, the Court has to respond to the questions regarding EU legal acts 
being disputed for violations of fundamental rights in national laws. In this 
21  Tamm, D., The history of the Court of Justice, p.29, http://research.ku.dk/search/?pure=en/
publications/the-history-of-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-since-its-origin%28b-
c456acc-cc1c-4518-9186-3cd6297653e2%29/export.html
22 Crnić Grotić, V.; Sgardelli Car,N., Ljudska prava u Europskoj uniji u praksi Europskog 
suda u Luksemburgu, Zbornik PFZ, 60, (5) 971-994 (2010), p. 974
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case the Court explained that its jurisdiction is to apply Community law only, 
and that it is not competent in the fi eld of national laws of the Member States, 
such as in Stork and Geitling: “it is not for the Court, whose function is to 
judge the legality of decisions adopted by the High Authority ... to ensure that 
the provisions of domestic law are respected, even constitutional provisions in 
force in one or another Member State... Therefore the Court cannot interpret 
nor apply Article 14 of the German Constitution by examining the legality 
of the decision of High Authority. Furthermore, Community law, according 
to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, does not 
contain any general principle that explicitly or otherwise guarantees the reali-
zation of violated rights23.”
The Court has changed its position for the fi rst time in 1969 in the Judgment 
Erich Stauder v City, where it stated that it ensures the respect of fundamental 
human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law. 
In the seventies, the Court changed its line of reasoning and highlighted the 
fundamental rights as general principles that bind communities and their bod-
ies. In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the ECJ had stated that “the validi-
ty of Community measures could only be judged according to Community cri-
teria, not according to principles enshrined in the German constitution24.” The 
ECJ also explained that: “Respect for fundamental rights forms an integral 
part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of justice, the pro-
tection of such rights, while inspired by the constitutional tradition common to 
the Member States must be ensured within the framework of the structure and 
objectives of the community25.”
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (Solange I) [1974], the German Feder-
al Constitutional Court (FCC) did not accept this ruling, and stated that the 
protection of fundamental human rights was an essential element of the Basic 
Law, and that this power could not automatically be restricted by transferring 
sovereignty to a supranational organization under Article 24 of the Basic law. 
In the opinion of the FCC, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Basic 
Law were insuffi ciently protected under Community law, as the Community 
lacked a democratically legitimated and directly elected parliament, as well as 
a codifi ed catalogue of human rights. 
In 1986, the German Constitutional Court gave up that attitude in Solange 
II, claiming that “as long as the Community generally ensured an effective 
23 Judg. February 4th, 1959, Judg. 1/58, Stork V.High Authority, February 1960, Judg. 16-
18/59, Geitling v. High Authority
24  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125
25  Ibid.
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protection of fundamental rights…the FCC would no longer exercise its juris-
diction to decide on the application of secondary Community legislation26.”
In the “Nold” case, the ECJ based the protection of the fundamental rights 
not only on the constitutional principles of the Member States, but also on the 
international conventions.
The next important step in the fi eld of the protection of the human rights was 
the Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Com-
mission from 1977, which gave primary importance to the protection of fun-
damental rights deriving from the constitution of the Member States and the 
European Convention for the protection of human fi rst and fundamental free-
doms.
In its cases, the ECJ has often dealt with issues of violations of the Conven-
tion27. In 1989, in the ERT case concerning a Greek television monopoly, the 
ECJ referred expressly to the “freedom of expression, as embodied in Article 
10 of the Convention on Human Rights, as a general principle of law the ob-
servance of which is ensured by the Court28.”
There have been occasions when similar cases were differently interpreted by 
the two courts, such as in the example of  the Grogan case (of the ECJ) and 
the Open Door and Dublin Well Woman (of the ECtHR), in which Article 
10 of the Convention on the right to freedom of expression was interpreted29. 
A student association distributed a leafl et to women who wanted to have an 
abortion in other countries, but sharing of information was prohibited by the 
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children. The ECJ did not decide on the 
main issue of the legality of abortion, but ruled that abortion constitutes a “ser-
vice” within the meaning of Article 60 of the EEC Treaty, and thus was not 
subject to restrictions. So, the key question was whether there was a violation 
of Community law rather than national law. A related case is the Open Door 
and Dublin Well Woman, in which the European Court of Human Rights was 
deciding on the freedom of expression. Open Door Ltd was an organization 
which provided free information on abortion services and which fi led a com-
26 BVerfGE 73, 339 2 BvR 197/83 Solange II-decision
27  Vivien Prais v Council of the European Communities. - Case 130-75., 27 October 1976; 15 
December 1995. - Union royalebelge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc 
Bosman, Case C-415/93
28  Tamm, D., The history of the Court of Justice, p.29, http://research.ku.dk/search/?pure=en/
publications/the-history-of-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-since-its-origin%28b-
c456acc-cc1c-4518-9186-3cd6297653e2%29/export.html
29  Crnić Grotić, V.; Sgardelli Car, N., Ljudska prava u Europskoj uniji u praksi Europskog 
suda u Luksemburgu, Zbornik PFZ, 60, (5) 971-994 (2010), p. 984, 985.
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plaint because of the ban on providing information. The ECtHR found that 
there was a violation of the right to freedom of expression, as entrenched in 
Article 10 of the Convention.
Differences in interpretation have also occurred in the case of Hoechst AG, in 
connection with the search of business premises based on an investigation, in 
which the plaintiff considered that there was a violation of the right to protec-
tion of privacy of the home guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention30. 
The ECJ stated that this right does not apply to business premises. The ECtHR 
provided a completely contrary interpretation in the Niemietz case, when they 
claimed that “understanding of the notion of private life should not exclude 
activities of a professional or business nature since, fi nally, most of the people 
in its working life has an important, if not the greatest option of creating re-
lationships with the outside world31.” Although there have been differences in 
the interpretation of the two Courts, in a similar case in 2002, the ECJ referred 
to the practice of the ECtHR as relevant, and accepted its explanation.
The ECJ has respected the reasoning of the ECtHR and has increasingly re-
ferred to Strasbourg case law, although it has never used the expression “bound 
by” the Convention. Rather, the Conventions have been seen as a source of 
inspiration taken from general principles of law.32
5.  THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ECTHR AND THE PROTECTION 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EU
At the end of the 1970’s the Strasbourg court was confronted with the Euro-
pean Community (EC) question for the fi rst time. In 1978, in CFDT v the EC, 
the applicants directed their complaint against the EC as such but also against 
all EC member states taken collectively and individually. The Strasbourg court 
decided that it did not have jurisdiction because the EC is not a contracting 
party to the ECtHR. However, a change in the line of reasoning of the ECtHR 
came in M.&Co.v. Germany where it stated “that it is in fact not competent 
ratione personae to examine proceedings before or decisions of organs of the 
European Communities, the latter not being a Party to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights”. But, “the transfer of powers does not necessarily ex-
clude a State’s responsibility under the Convention with regard to the exercise 
30 Ibid., p. 986.
31 Ibid., p. 987.
32  Laurent Scheek, The Relationship between the European Courts and Integration through 
Human Rights, ZaoRV 65 (2005), 837-885, p.853
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of transferred powers33.” So, Member States have to respect their obligations 
which come from the Convention, no matter if they are part of other organiza-
tion as the Member States of EU are34.
In the Bosphorus case, an applicant claimed that an EU measure had infringed 
their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. The European 
Court of Human Rights stated that it would review EC measures through na-
tional implementing acts only if the EU system of human rights protection is 
below the level of the Convention standard. The decision illustrates the ambi-
tion of the ECtHR to steer the middle course between the necessity to confi rm 
its former case-law on the Member States’ responsibility for transferred power 
so as not to give carte blanche to the EC, and the diffi culty of providing the 
EU Member States with a system of control as regards the compatibility of 
Community acts with the ECtHR35.
In the Matthew judgment, the ECtHR reversed its position and showed that it 
feels responsible for controlling EU legal acts, and that is able to pass judgment 
on a Member State. The case was about deciding whether the United Kingdom 
could be held responsible for not having organized European elections in Gi-
braltar in 1994. The Court concluded that the United Kingdom was responsible 
for the consequences of the Maastricht Treaty. The ECtHR refrained from re-
viewing EU action based on the doctrine of “equivalent protection”, claiming 
that as long as the protection offered by the EU in a certain case is not dys-
functional, and thus not manifestly defi cient, it will refrain from intervention36.
Some theoreticians have stated that the ECtHR started to control human rights 
on the European level slowly and gradually. However, the ECtHR considered 
that it has no competence to review EU acts directly.  
6. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The next step in the formal protection of human rights in the European Union 
was the Charter of fundamental rights, and with its application the possibility 
of contradictions in the case-law between the two Courts has increased.
33  M.&Co.v. Germany[1990]ECHR, (Ser. A)
34 Kuhnert, K., http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/Volume 2, Issue 2 (December) 2006, p. 176
35 Kuhnert, K., http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/Volume 2, Issue 2 (December) 2006, p. 178
36 Gless, S. and Martin, J., The comparative method in European Courts: A comparison be-
tween the CJEU and ECtHR, Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 1, 
Issue 1,2013, p.49
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Often cited as the most important reason for its adoption is the EU crisis of 
legitimacy, which is signifi cantly related to the lack of Union protection of 
fundamental rights. Furthermore, the increased visibility of the fundamental 
rights which would encourage citizens to use them37 is often indicated as an 
additional reason.
Many of the provisions in the Charter are based on, but are not identical to 
those of the ECtHR. In the Charter preamble it is stated that the Charter “reaf-
fi rms the rights as they result, in particular, from … the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms…the social 
charters adopted by the Community and the Council of Europe and the case-
law of … the European Court of Human Rights38.”
Regarding EU competences, in the Charter it is stated that it “does not estab-
lish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify powers 
and tasks defi ned by the Treaties39.” 
The ECtHR defi ned a minimum standard for the protection of human rights 
which the Member States should respect. That minimum standard is also guar-
anteed in the Charter, but the Charter also leaves space for providing more ex-
tensive protection40. However, the level of protection provided by the Charter is 
vague. In Article 53 of the Charter it is stated: “Nothing in this Charter shall be 
interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as recognized, in their respective fi elds of application, by Union law 
and international law…including the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ 
constitutions.” The Article provides protection for already recognized human 
rights and freedoms. Although the possibility for confl ict between rights rec-
ognized by international organizations and the rights recognized by the Char-
ter is low, which is easy to conclude from ECtHR and ECJ practice, that pos-
sibility increases when, for example, the Member States provide a higher level 
of fundamental rights protection than it is provided by the Charter. In that way, 
the supremacy and the autonomy of EU law could be endangered. The Court 
addressed this issue in the Melloni case C-399/11. The case concerned the is-
sue of relation of different standards of human rights protection at the national 
level and European Union level regarding the execution of a European Arrest 
Warrant (“EAW”). The Spanish Constitutional Court asked the ECJ the three 
37 Selanec, G., Reforma Europske unije - Lisabonski ugovor, Povelja temeljnih prava,  Na-
rodne Novine, Zagreb 2009., p.188
38  EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000/C 364/01), Preamble
39  Ibid., Article 50, para. 2
40  Ibid., Article 52 para. 3
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questions in which the third was, whether a Member State can, based on Ar-
ticle 53 of the Charter, provide a higher level of protection than the protection 
given by European Union law.  The ECJ ruled that „only in a situation where 
an action of a Member State is not entirely determined by European Union 
law, do national courts and authorities remain free to apply national standards 
of protection of fundamental rights. However, even in these cases, the level of 
protection provided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as interpreted by 
the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law 
must not thereby be compromised.“ 41 The reasoning of the ECJ demonstrates 
that any kind of EU law, primary as well as secondary, is superior to any kind 
of national law of the Member States, including the national constitution.42 In 
the future there is a possibility of a confl ict between EU and national levels 
of fundamental rights protection while the ECJ made its reasoning about fun-
damental rights central, without leaving the Member states the possibility to 
provide a higher level of protection. This set positioned the EU fundamental 
rights protection at the maximum level. A possible consequence could be that 
an EU act could never be declared invalid for breach of fundamental rights. 
Daniel Halberstam stated that „it should have been clear that the generic reser-
vation of more expansive rights at the Member State level was dead on arrival. 
Since the earliest days of the Community, and confi rmed repeatedly even after 
the Union expressed its concern for human rights, a Member State was not al-
lowed to object to EU law simply on the grounds that the EU measure violated 
an idiosyncratic human right found in that Member State’s constitution. The 
rights reservation in Article 53 FRC could not possibly resurrect those claims. 
To be sure, there can be—and there is—a certain give and take between the 
Member State high courts and the CJEU on defi ning the extent of rights pro-
tection with the Union.“43
Regarding the fi eld of application of the Charter, it is unclear whether the 
Charter is binding on human rights issues in the area of EU law alone, or also 
in areas left to the jurisdiction of the Member States, in which the EU has the 
power to coordinate and support them44.  The Article 51 states that the Charter 
only applies to acts of the Member States” when they are implementing Union 
41  Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal,(2013)
42  Nergelius, J., Kristoffersson, - Human rights in EU law 2014: Two key cases of 2013, 
Swedish studies in European law, Volume 6, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2015. p. 5
43  Halberstam, D., It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU 
Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward Michigan Law, University of Michigan, Paper 
NO.432, 2015, p.21
44  Selanec, G., Reforma Europske unije, - Lisabonski ugovor, Povelja temeljnih prava, 
Narodne Novine, Zagreb 2009., p.177
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law’’. It could be concluded that the scope of the Charter is limited on human 
rights issues in the area of EU law alone. The ECJ delivered a judgment on 
that matter in the Fransson case. The case concerned criminal proceeding has 
been initiated against Mr. Akerberg Fransson for tax fraud. He was charged 
with several fi nancial tax offences by the Swedish authorities. Mr. Fransson 
considered that the charges were violating the ne bis in idem principle, because 
he had already been subject to tax surcharge for the same facts. He relied on 
Article 50 CFR to challenge the charges before the domestic court. The issue 
was whether the Charter was applied in the case or whether the case fell within 
the scope of EU law. The Court, relying on its case law, ruled that Article 51 of 
the Charter, is to be interpreted in the following manner: “The requirement to 
respect fundamental rights defi ned in the context of the Union is only binding 
on the Member States when they act in the scope of Union law“ 45. It can be 
concluded that the ECJ did not pay attention to the Charter’s wording which 
limited the Charter’s scope strictly to situations in which national legislators 
implement EU law. Instead it concluded that Charter applies to Member State 
actions that are within the scope of EU law which is a very broad interpretation 
of the Charter. The questions of the level of protection provided by the Charter 
and the question of the area of its application is very important, not only theo-
retically but also practically, while the Union is slowly expanding its jurisdic-
tion in an area which is left for the Member States to regulate. In the Maruko 
case the ECJ stated that de facto it has authority in an area that is exclusively in 
competences of Member States: “Even when a matter falls within the ambit of 
their reserved powers, the Member States cannot absolve themselves from the 
general duty imposed on them to respect the law of the Union, which includes 
the respect of the provisions relating to the principle of non-discrimination.” 
Because of the above mentioned facts, the question arises, should there be a 
third arbiter (since there is a great possibility for confl icts between constitu-
tional Member States and ECJ judges) that would bind the EU? The answer 
could offer the projected accession to the ECHR that triggers questions about 
the autonomy of EU law, which is the genetic code of that system of law.46
7.  EU ACCESS TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS
The ECJ and the ECtHR are courts with different histories, within differ-
ent organizations, with different goals, but both competitive and cooperative. 
45 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson (2013)
46  Eeckhout, P., Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law: Pluralism or Integration?, 
Current Legal Problems Advance Access published June 28, 2013, p.2
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However, this multiple human rights protection system causes much uncer-
tainty. The EU jurisdiction was limited in the area of human rights while un-
der the obligation to respect the ECtHR. Individuals could turn to Strasbourg 
and claim that their fundamental rights had been breached47. When a lot of 
competences were transferred to the EU, individuals were deprived of that 
possibility in a fi eld which was and is regulated by EU acts.  
With that being said, remains the fact that the EU competences have multiplied 
over the last 20 years, and have grown beyond just economic ones, leading to 
an absence of external judicial control.
Until the Lisbon Treaty, the EU did not have the legal basis to accede to 
the Convention because it did not have legal personality, and, as far 
as the Council of Europe was concerned, its Statute provided that only states 
can access its Statute, not the EU. However, Article 6(2) of the Treaty of the 
EU provides that “The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms.” The accession of 
the EU to the Convention became a legal obligation under the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which entered into force on December 1st, 2009.
After accession, the ECJ would remain the fi nal authority on the interpretation 
of EU law and the ECtHR would be the fi nal authority on the interpretation 
of the European Convention of Human Rights48. The Union shall be super-
vised by the ECtHR with regard to its compliance with the Convention and the 
ECtHR will have the possibility to review the acts of EU institutions49. Indi-
viduals will be able to fi le a complaint about the infringement of ECtHR rights 
by the EU before the European Court of Human Rights, but they will need to 
turn to the ECJ before they can lodge an application to the ECtHR. In that way, 
many theoretical questions would be resolved. But will there be an accession, 
and under which conditions? On December 18th, 2014, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union ruled that the draft agreement on the accession of the Eu-
ropean Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which 
was fi nalized in April 2013, is not compatible with EU law.
The Court states that “there is the approach adopted in the draft agreement, 
which is to treat the EU as a State and to give it a role identical in every respect 
to that of any other Contracting Party, specifi cally disregards the intrinsic na-
ture of the EU. Accession is liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU 
and undermine the autonomy of EU law and that the agreement envisaged 
47 Ritleng, D., The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human 
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contains no provision to prevent such a development...”. It further says that “the 
ECHR gives the Contracting Parties the power to lay down higher standards of 
protection than those guaranteed by the ECHR, the ECHR should be coordi-
nated with the Charter and also that the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU 
law are not compromised and that there is no provision in the draft agreement 
to ensure such coordination.”
As the Courts’ main reasons for rejecting the draft agreement, it is stated that 
it “disregards the intrinsic nature of the EU”, “undermines the autonomy of EU 
law”, “that the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are compromised”.
All these constitute a system called the “sui generis” system. The “sui generis” 
system of the EU was created by ECJ judgments. The ECJ was the key factor 
for creating an autonomous system which gives primacy, unity and effective-
ness to EU law. The fact is that ECJ has the authorization to change the auton-
omous system, “sui generis” system, accepted by the Member states.  The “sui 
generis” defi nition does not prohibit the questioning of these specifi c charac-
teristics.  “Specifi c characteristics” are by defi nition specifi c, which means 
they are not lasting and stable, but subject to change. Indeed, it is easier to 
affect specifi c characteristics of the EU, precisely because of its particularities 
in functioning, than maybe a parliamentary republic, federal or interna-
tional organization, whose functioning we know very well.  However, every 
system needs autonomy and preservation of its effectiveness. EU law has its 
own foundational rules and principles. It has its own rules of recognition. 50 
The CJEU’s has and should have the power to determine what the law of the 
Union is and to be ultimately responsible for  questions of the interpretation 
and validity of EU law .But that EU law autonomy has clear limits, and ought 
not to lead to the  autarky of EU law. 51
8. CONCLUSION
The relation between the Courts, including the regulation of human rights, is 
a complex area that has an impact on the daily life of the citizens of the 
Union. In this Article, the main issues regarding the formal organization of 
European human rights, its complexity, multidimensionality and ambiguity, 
are shown. There is a plurality of legal Systems, each with their autonomy, 
courts and legal perspective, its limits and boundaries. The accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights raises many 
50 Eeckhout,P., Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law: Pluralism or Integration?, Cur-
rent Legal Problems Advance Access published June 28, 2013,p.11
51  Ibid., p.4
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questions regarding the very foundations of the European Union system. Now 
the question remains – how and under which conditions will the EU fulfi ll its 
obligation under the Lisbon treaty? It remains to be seen.
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